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Statutory Comment
Sales: Minnesota Statute Regulates Consumer Notes and
Limits Rights of Assignee-MINN. STAT. § 325.940-.941
(1971)
The typical consumer installment credit arrangement has
many of the characteristics of an adhesion contract.' Unequal
bargaining power allows the merchant and the finance agency
to which the paper will later be assigned to impose terms
highly favorable to themselves, and the confusing arrange-
ment and complexity of the papers the consumer is asked to
sign often result in a failure to appreciate the implications of
his bargain. 2 Many conditional sales contracts contain clauses
waiving any defenses the consumer might have against either
the seller or the assignee finance agency. In addition to the con-
tract, the consumer typically signs a note which is later nego-
tiated, giving the transferee finance agency the rights of a holder
in due course (freedom from defenses available to the prior par-
ties among themselves and the right to enforce payment of the
instrument against all parties liable thereon) .3 Once the aver-
age consumer's note is negotiated or the consumer has signed a
waiver of defenses clause, he no longer has any self-help remedy
and therefore pays even if he has not received an acceptable
product.4 In an attempt to remedy these problems, a new Min-
1. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 CoLuM. L. REV. 445, 472 (1968); Littlefield, Preserving
Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Hole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 272, 278 (1969); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts,
35 TEMP. L.Q. 125, 281 (1962).
2. Kripke, supra note 1, at 472; Vernon, Priorities, The UCC and
Commercial Financing, 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 53, 548 (1963).
3. The consumer can still assert the "real" defenses, e.g., duress,
incapacity or misrepresentation. See MINN. STAT. §§ 336.3-.305 (1969).
These cause the instrument to be void-the consumer never actually
consented to be bound and thus the instrument lacked legal efficacy at
its inception-but they obviously would occur infrequently, and even
then the defense would be vulnerable to estoppel. W. HAWKLAND,
COMMERCIAL PAPER 77-78 (1959).
4. Case law in Minnesota allows consumers to avoid the holder
in due course shield only where the assignee actively participates in the
transaction from its origin. See International Finance Corp. v. Rieger,
272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965), holding that an assignee so par-
ticipating had acquired knowledge of the conditional liability of the
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nesota statute (MVnN. STAT. §§ 325.94, 325.941 (1971))5 appears
purchaser and therefore could not become a holder in due course.
The decisive factor in finding a close enough connection between the
finance agency and seller to defeat the holder in due course shield was
that the agency demanded an installation certificate signed by the buyer.
A consumer, in order to avail himself of this defense to the holder in
due course shield, must carry the difficult burden of proving the requi-
site relationship between the seller and the finance agency. Attorney's
fees and the inconvenience of a suit deter many consumers.
5. The statute is effective as to consumer credit sales entered
into on or after July 1, 1971, and reads as follows:
325.94 Definitions
Subdivision 1. As used in this section and section 325.941,
the following terms shall have the meanings assigned to them.
Subd. 2. "Consumer credit sale" means a sale of goods or
services in which(a) credit is granted by a seller who regularly engages as
a seller in credit transactions of the same kind;(b) the buyer is a natural person; and(c) the goods or services are purchased primarily for a
personal, family or household purpose, and not for commercial,
agricultural, or business purpose.
Subd. 3. "Goods" means all tangible personal chattels, but
not including money, things in action or intangible personal
property other than merchandise certificates or coupons as
herein described. The term includes such chattels which are
furnished or used, at the time of sale or subsequently, in the
modernization, rehabilitation, repair, alteration, improvement
or construction of real property so as to become a part thereof
whether or not severable therefrom. The term also includes
merchandise certificates or coupons, issued by a retail seller,
not redeemable in cash and to be used in their face amount in
lieu of cash, in exchange for goods or services sold by such
seller.
Subd. 4. "Services" means work, labor, or services of any
kind.
Subd. 5. "Sale of goods" includes, without limitation, any
agreement in the form of a bailment or lease of goods if the
bailee or lessee agrees to pay as compensation for use a sum
substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value
of the goods involved and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee
will become, or for no other or a nominal consideration has the
option to become, the owner of the goods upon full compliance
with his obligations under the agreement.
325.941 Restrictions
Subdivision 1. Instruments. In a consumer credit sale, the
seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other
than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or
lessee. A holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable
instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of this
section.
Subd. 2. Provision restrictions. No contract or obligation
relating to a consumer credit sale shall contain any provision
by which:(a) The consumer agrees not to assert against an as-
signee any claim or defense arising out of the transaction;
(b) In the absence of consumer's default, the holder may
arbitrarily and without reasonable cause, accelerate the matur-
ity of any part or all of the amount owing thereunder;(c) A power of attorney is given to confess judgment in
this state, or an assignment of wages is given;(d) The seller or holder of the contract or obligation, or a
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to deny holder in due course status to holders of consumer pa-
per 6 and prohibits the insertion into it of clauses which waive the
consumer's defenses against either the seller or assignee.7
The statute does not expressly state that holder in due
course status may not be achieved with consumer paper, but an
analysis of Subdivision (1) of Section 325.941 leaves one with
that conclusion. The first part of the subdivision states that "the
seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other than
a check" in a consumer credit sale. A literal reading of this pro-
vision might indicate that a merchant is absolutely precluded from
taking an instrument that has the appearance of negotiability,
that such instruments are void, and that present consumer credit
practices are illegal. But this interpretation is unreasonable if
only because the statute does not provide any active criminal or
civil sanctions for violation. A better reading, and one appar-
ently demanded by the second part of the subdivision, is that
while consumer paper is still transferable," the transferee may
not attain holder in due course status. Thus no change in the
form of the consumer credit sale is legally required.
Further, Subdivision (1) also states that "A holder is not
in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice that
it is issued in violation of [the statute]." "Good faith" is, of
course, a prerequisite to holder in due course status. The offi-
person acting on his behalf, is given authority to enter upon
the consumer's premises unlawfully or to commit any breach
of the peace in the repossession of the goods;
(e) The consumer waives any right of action against the
seller or holder of the contract or obligation, or any other per-
son acting on his behalf, for any illegal act committed in the
collection of payments under the contract or obligation or in
the repossession of goods;(f) The consumer relieves the seller from any liability
for any legal remedy which the consumer may have against the
seller under the contract or obligation or any separate instru-
ment executed in connection therewith.
Subd. 3. Claims and defenses. Any assignee of the con-
tract or obligation relating to the consumer credit sale shall be
subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer against the
seller arising from the sale, notwithstanding any agreement to
the contrary. Provided, however, that the assignee's liability
under this subdivision shall not exceed the amount owing to
the assignee at the time the claim or defense is asserted against
the assignee. The rights of the consumer under this subdivi-
sion can only be asserted as a matter of defense to or set off
against a claim by the assignee.
6. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(1) (1971).
7. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(2) (1971).
8. Statement of Robert W. Herr, Assistant Attorney General, be-
fore the Minnesota Senate's Commerce Committee, April 15, 1971;




cial comment to Section 2.403 of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, which contains the same language as Subdivision (1), in-
terprets the statement to mean that a finance agency normally
will be unable to meet the good faith requirements of Uniform
Commercial Code Section 3-302 to become a holder in due course
since notice that the transaction was with a consumer will arise
from the appearance of the instrument and the agency's credit
investigation. The comment points out that in rare instances
second or third takers may still achieve holder in due course
status if they are not persons who generally would understand
the consumer origin of the paper.9 This part of Subdivision (1)
then is most reasonably read to place upon the assignee of
consumer paper the burden of showing that he was not on no-
tice.10 Finance agencies will, of course, find this difficult, but the
intent of the statute clearly is to make the seller or the assignee
the moving party and place the consumer in a defensive posture.'
Thus, if the paper, on its face,'12 indicates facts that would alert a
commercially honest finance agency, an agency taker should be
held to be on notice and to have the duty to investigate. Both
merchants and finance agencies will soon know of the statute,
and this very knowledge will make it difficult to defend a failure
to investigate.
The statute provides additional protection by not allowing
consumers to waive claims or defenses against the assignee that
9. See, e.g., Fresno Loan & Thrift v. Roberts, 207 Cal. App. 2d
899, 25 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1962); Project, supra note 8, at 744-58.
10. Mn-m. STAT. § 336.1-201(25) (c) (1969) broadly defines notice:
"A person has 'notice' of a fact when ... from all the facts and circum-
stances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know it
exists." This definition is important since showing actual notice is
difficult. See Westfield Investment Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575,
181 A.2d 809 (1962); Project, supra note 8, at 755, 756 n.725.
Minnesota case law heretofore has created a presumption that an
assignee of what appears to be a negotiable instrument is prima facie a
holder in due course. Gordon v. Oberle, 183 Minn. 188, 235 N.W. 875
(1931) (interpreting statute); Cummings v. Thompson, 18 Minn. 228
(1872).
11. This avoids putting the consumer in the difficult position of
having to show that the assignee had notice. See, e.g., Pennington Cty.
Bank v. First State Bank of Moorhead, 110 Minn. 263, 125 N.W. 119
(1910); cf. King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 DicK. L. REv. 207, 209-10 (1960).
12. Negotiability is determined by the face of the instrument
alone. AMUN. STAT. § 336.3-119(2) (1969); First National Bank v.
Compo Board 1fg. Co., 61 Minn. 274, 63 N.W. 731 (1895); Western
Sur. Co. v. Friederichs, 241 Minn. 492, 63 N.W.2d 565 (1954). The
name of the merchant payee and the amount are two factors which
may indicate consumer origin of a note on its face.
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arise out of the sale transaction. 3 This prohibition includes all
waivers, whether directed to defenses against the seller or the as-
signee and whether or not they are in the contract itself. Sub-
division (1) of Section 325.941 specifically prohibits the insertion
of waiver clauses pertaining to assignees into consumer contracts,
and Subdivision (3) states that the assignee of a "contract or ob-
ligation relating to the consumer credit sale shall be subject to all
the claims and defenses of the consumer against the seller aris-
ing from the sale, notwithstanding any agreement to the con-
trary."'1 4 In opting for an absolute prohibition of these cut-off
devices, the Minnesota legislature wisely rejected the "delay of
cut-offs" approach. Under delay statutes,'" when the finance
agency buys consumer paper it notifies the consumer, who must
then notify the agency within a certain period'0 of any de-
fenses he has in order to retain them.17 The alternative adopted
13. MINN. STAT. §§ 325.941 (2) (a), (3) (1971).
MINN. STAT. § 336.9-206 (1969) states that a waiver of defenses
clause protecting an assignee is enforceable unless there is a state stat-
ute or decision which makes a different rule for consumer transactions.
Since Minnesota has no decision establishing a different rule (see com-
ment following MrUNN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-206 (1966) ), waiver of de-
fenses clauses were validated by Section 336.9-206 prior to the enact-
ment of this statute. The fact that the legislature made the change is
important since at least one state supreme court has read Section 9-206
of the Uniform Commercial Code to mean that only decisions estab-
lishing a different rule made prior to the adoption of the Code were in-
tended to control, and thus held that it did not have the power to pro-
hibit waivers itself. Jennings v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 442 S.W.
2d 565 (Ky. 1969); 58 Ky. L.J. 850, 852-54 (1970). The statute must
also be read in conjunction with Sections 3-302 and 3-304 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which define "holder and due course" and "no-
tice to purchaser."
14. The word "claims" is apparently used in order to indicate that
any valid claim the consumer has against the seller can be asserted
against the assignee and that set-offs are not limited to the traditional
defenses. The most important defenses that will be allowed are failure
of consideration and breach of warranty. Fraud in procurement, ille-
gality, collateral agreement, mistake and duress should also be avail-
able. The consumer still runs the risk of estoppel to assert these de-
fenses, but the clear policy of the statute to retain consumer defenses
should influence a court in deciding whether estoppel should apply.
15. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262D (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 69, § 1402 (Supp. 1971); TEx. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.07
(1971).
16. Five, 45 and 30 days respectively, in the statutes cited in note
15 supra.
17. The device is intended to eliminate defenses made in bad faith
by defaulting buyers. Littlefield, supra note 1, at 292; Project, supra
note 8, at 757-58. The device is based on the mistaken theory that the
consumer will read the finance agency's notice, understand the legal jar-
gon it contains, discover any product defects within the time period,
[Vol. 56:510
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in Subdivision (3) is very similar to the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code's Section 2.404, Alternative (A). That section makes
it clear that the assignee does not have greater rights than the
merchant to recover on a claim against the consumer. But it also
makes it clear that the consumer does not have as great a right
to recover against the finance agency as he does against the mer-
chant. He can use his claim or defense only as a set-off, not to
exceed the amount outstanding when the set-off is asserted. The
consumer thus is provided with an incentive to early discovery
and notification of defenses since the size of the potential set-off
decreases as payments are made on the installment obligation.
Since the consumer cannot recover payments already made, the
agency still retains partial protection of its investment.
The scope of the Minnesota statute is unusually broad, cov-
ering sales of services as well as goods,' s and explicitly covering
those goods and services used in the litigation-prone 9 home im-
provement and repair industry.20 Further, it does not provide
for an exemption where FHA financing is involved,2 ' or allow
merchants to avoid its provisions by using coupons redeemable
for merchandise-they are included in the term "goods."22 The
statute also prohibits certain credit practices which tend to put
the consumer at a legal disadvantage. It forbids the insertion
of clauses in consumer credit contracts which: (1) give a power
of attorney to confess judgments;2 3 (2) accelerate all or any part
and then notify the agency in writing. Jordan & Warren, The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 387, 435 (1968); Note,
Consumer Protection-The Role of the Cutoff Device in Consumer
Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 505, 521. As far as the finance agency is
concerned, the actual effect of delay statutes often may be to limit the
merchant's warranty to the time irriod the law gives for notification.
How long this period should be is difficult to decide since the con-
sumer must have the goods long enough to see if they are acceptable,
and yet the period cannot be too long or the statute is ineffective.
Project, supra note 8, at 757.
18. MDNN. STAT. § 325.94(2) (1971).
19. Matthews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570,
137 N.W.2d 280 (1965); McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of
Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 387, 401 (1967).
20. It should be noted that the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is
not as explicit about home improvement coverage as the Minnesota
statute. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.105(1) & (3) is limited
by Section 2.102, which, by implication, might be read to exclude home
improvements.
21. Other states exempt instruments that would pass in an FHA
transaction. E.g., MATss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 12c (1968). Be-
cause of the statute, the FHA is now insuring consumer notes which do
not give the taker a holder in due course shield under Minnesota law.
22. Am. STAT. § 325.94(3) (1971).
23. Mu. STAT. § 325.941(2) (c) (1971). This is an exception to
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of the debt without any reasonable cause; 2 ' (3) allow the assign-
ment of wages; 25 (4) allow the seller or holder to enter the con-
sumer's premises unlawfully or to commit any breach of the
peace in the repossession of goods;26 or (5) waive any claim
against the seller or holder for illegal acts committed in the re-
possession of goods or collection of payments.27
The statute also prohibits the insertion of any clause which
"relieves the seller of any liability for any legal remedy" arising
out of the transaction which the consumer may have against the
seller.28 This provision is worded broadly, but should be read in
the context of the problems the statute is designed to solve. The
intent seems to be to allow the consumer to voice his defenses in
court while not unreasonably restraining the seller's freedom to
bargain. Thus, for example, the statute should not be read to
limit a merchant's reasonable disclaimer of warranty, while it
should prohibit blanket waiver clauses including all remedies
against the seller.
One shortcoming of the statute is that it does not state the
exact effect of the insertion of a prohibited provision on the rest
of the contract or the consumer's obligations. While it might be
argued that the whole contract becomes unenforceable,2 9 in order
to insure that the statute will be an effective deterrent, the most
reasonable reading of these prohibitions is that any clause in vio-
the Minnesota Confession of Judgments Statute, MINN. STAT. § 548.22
(1969), but does not specifically amend that statute. Confession ofjudgment is allowed under the Uniform Commercial Code if the state so
legislates. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-122(d). The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code does not allow the practice. UNIFORM CONSUMEIR
CREDIT CODE § 2.415. The United States Supreme Court is now deciding
the constitutionality of confession of judgment statutes in consumer
transactions. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971) (oral argument heard Nov. 16,
1971, 40 U.S.L.W. 3233). The acts are attacked as violating due proc-
ess by not allowing a consumer his day in court. It is alleged the
confession provision is signed due to unequal bargaining power and
thus is not freely given.
24. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(2) (b) (1971).
25. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(2)(c) (1971).
26. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(2)(d) (1971).
27. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(2)(e) (1971).
28. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(2) (f) (1971).
29. The California Supreme Court has held in an arguably analo-
gous case that a contract in violation of a similar statute for the reason
that it omitted a required clause is not binding on the buyer. City
Lincoln-Mercury v. Lindsey, 52 Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959). But
this raises the question of who gets the chattel when the contract be-
comes unenforceable as to the paying party because of the violation
of the statute. Certainly it is not fair for the consumer to keep it with-
out paying for it. See Project, supra note 8, at 760.
[Vol. 56:510
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lation thereof is void, since the former remedy is so extreme that
had it been intended by the legislature, it would have been ex-
plicitly stated.30
The broad coverage of the statute, noted above,3 1 is not with-
out its limits. True consumer loans, wherein the consumer bor-
rows from a separate finance agency to make a cash purchase
of goods, are not covered by the statute.3 " Finance agencies
rightfully argue that they cannot be responsible for these goods,
since they do not control what the consumer does with the
money once he gets it. But it is important that there be some
way to include the transaction which, although in the form of
a consumer loan, is actually a consumer credit sale. Where,
for example, the prospective buyer is told by the merchant
to go to a certain finance agency, the merchant and finance
agency already having arranged for such transactions, the money
borrowed can only be used to purchase the merchant's product,
and in reality this is the same as the merchant giving the custo-
mer credit and immediately discounting his note to the finance
agency. The statute is certainly directed to the case where the
merchant and the finance agency are this closely related. If a
sale is in the form of a consumer loan, a court may interpose the
consumer's defenses against the merchant in a suit by the lender
without affecting the holder in due course doctrine3 3 since there
is no holder in due course. This solution already has been used
in a Minnesota case,34 but now a court may rely upon the statute
as a statement of Minnesota policy on the question. Whether
30. California found it necessary to add a provision which made
all such banned clauses void but which expressly went no further.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.4 (1971) ("Any provision in a contract which is
prohibited by this chapter shall be void but shall not otherwise affect
the validity of the contract.").
31. See text accompanying notes 18-28 supra.
32. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code similarly allows con-
sumer loans as exceptions to its policy of retention of consumer de-
fenses. When laws like this were passed in other states consumer loans
became more prevalent. Nearly half of the responding finance agencies
in a mail survey in Massachusetts reported a shift to direct loans.
The amount of financing that actually changed to loans was not re-
searched. Note, supra note 17, at 524-25. But see Hogan, Integrating
the UCCC and the UCC-Limitations on Creditors Agreements and
Practices, 33 LAw & CoNTE1M. PRoBs. 686, 690-91 (1968); Note, A Case
Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Nego-
tiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 637-56 (1970).
33. See, e.g., UzrnoRm CONMIERCIAi CODE § 3-104, Comment 3;
Comment, 75 HAiv. L. REV. 437, 439 (1961).
34. International Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.
2d 172 (1965). See note 4 supra.
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interposition of defenses would be wise would depend upon the
facts of the individual case. If a court were satisfied that the di-
rect loan was only a sham, as where the bank's check was payable
to the consumer and the merchant jointly, the policy of the stat-
ute should allow the consumer to assert all defenses against the
finance agency. But determining the necessary degree of inter-
relationship between the finance agency and the merchant is a
difficult problem. One possible solution would be to deny con-
sumer defenses where the consumer has such dominion over the
money that he may use it for a purchase other than that indi-
cated to the lending agency.35 In any case, although true con-
sumer loans may increase when statutes such as Section 325.941
are enacted, 36 at least in the case of such loans sympathy for the
consumer is not so aroused as in the credit sale-negotiation trans-
action since he normally is not under the impression that he need
not repay the loan if the goods fail.37
Whether leases of goods are included within the terms of the
statute is somewhat unclear. They are included within the defi-
nition of "sales of goods"38 only if they are tantamount to a pur-
chase of the goods. Yet Section 325.941(3), which subjects as-
signees to defenses valid against assignors, does not refer to les-
sors, but only to sellers, whereas Subdivision (1) of that section
refers to both. One might take this to mean that assignees of les-
sors are exempt from the provision that all consumer defenses
can be asserted against the assignee. However, it is more rea-
sonable to assume that lessors' assignees are included, since the
subject of Subdivision (3) is "consumer credit sale [s] ," and these
include the leases defined in the statute. "Leases" might better
be defined by the character of the lessee than by the form of the
transaction 39 -the essential factor should not be whether the
lease is tantamount to a sale, but whether the lessee is a con-
sumer.
As has been noted, the statute does not provide any criminal
35. Littlefield, supra note 1, at 296; cf., 1956 MIcu. Arr'Y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. No. 2784, at 768.
36. See note 32 supra.
37. Note, supra note 17, at 526.
38. hNN. STAT. § 325.94(5) (1971). This is a paraphrase of the
federal Consumer Credit Protection Act's statement. 15 U.S.C. § 1602
(g) (1970).
39. E.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.106(1) and Com-




or civil sanction for failure to comply.40 Instead, Minnesota
relies on the consumer to protect his own rights and puts finan-
cial rather than criminal or civil pressure on finance agencies.
But without any active penalty merchants may still insert the
forbidden clauses in their contracts4 ' to frighten unrepresented
and complaining consumers into paying. In order to protect the
uninformed consumer the statute might have provided for suit
by the state or the consumer in cases where a finance agency in-
serts clauses that are banned by the statute, allowing either fines
or forfeiture of service charges as penalties. 42
The primary purpose of the statute is to allow a consumer
a real hearing before judgment is entered against him. The stat-
ute tends to equalize the consumer's legal position with that of
the merchant or finance agency in order to avoid some of the
evils of unequal commercial bargaining power. To do so it lim-
its the rights of the seller and assignee and gives the consumer
the self-help remedy of nonpayment. When a consumer now
threatens nonpayment the finance agency and seller will pay
serious attention because they realize a court at least will hear
the consumer's defenses. If the merchant is not available to
remedy a valid complaint, the consumer will not be required to
continue payments.
Also, by removing the preferred status of the finance agency
the statute creates an incentive for such agencies to assume a
policing role over the consumer credit transaction. This is a
proper role if only because the finance agencies are in the best
position to do it. 4 3 They have the facilities to investigate a mer-
40. In contrast, many other states do provide such sanctions.
E.g., CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 1812.6, 1812.7 (West Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. AN.
tit. 69, § 637(b) (1965). See also Project, supra note 8, at 758-68.
UNio~mv CoNsmn CREDIT CODE § 5.202 allows penalties in the form
of judicially administered fines of up to three times the service charge
in addition to forgiveness of the charge.
41. Experience has shown that the industry will tend to operate
at the outer limits of consumer protection legislation. Littlefield, supra
note 1, at 289-90.
42. California, for example, makes breach of a similar law a mis-
demeanor. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1812.6 (West Supp. 1971). It is punish-
able by forgiveness of the consumer's finance service charge and the
possibility that the consumer might recover a like amount from the
financer, in addition to the normal misdemeanor penalties. Cf. UNroiRu
CONSUMTER CREDIT CODE art. 6; Willier, A Uniform Consumer Creditor's
Code, 54 MAss. L.Q. 53, 57 (1969).
43. See Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla.
1953). See also Kripke, supra note 1, at 472; Littlefield, supra note 1,
at 281; Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Ef-
fective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 395, 417 (1966).
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chant's products, sales techniques and servicing; 4 4 they main-
tain a continuing relationship with the merchant, as opposed to
the consumer's single or episodic encounter; they can see that the
failure of the merchant's product is absorbed as an enterprise
risk and not made chargeable to unfortunate individual con-
sumers; and they can protect themselves by intensifying credit
checks and thereby lessening their own risks. The statute's re-
liance on finance agencies to police consumer credit transactions
may avoid the difficulties of cumbersome government regula-
tion.
There are several possible ways in which finance agencies
may react to the statute. First, they may demand a higher dis-
count rate on consumer paper due to their added risk,"15 raising
the price of credit. A second and more likely response is that
they will strengthen their recourse arrangements with the mer-
chant. Under a recourse arrangement the finance agency retains
an option to sell back to the merchant any consumer paper which
in its opinion is difficult to collect. Since the merchant must buy
back bad paper regardless of the merits of the consumer's com-
plaint, he will be encouraged to avoid such complaints to the fi-
nance company. The easiest way to do this is by providing bet-
ter products and service. The merchant also will seek to mini-
mize the occurrences of recourse out of fear of losing his finan-
cier. Another benefit of this arrangement is that if recourse oc-
curs, the suing party would be the merchant, the party with
whom the consumer has a complaint and against whom he can
assert all claims and defenses. Additionally, the consumer faces
involvement in only one suit, whereas, in the situation where
there has been no recourse, the finance agency sues the con-
sumer who, if he chooses to take the risk, may sue the merchant
to recover his loss.46 Thus statutes like Section 325.941 are not
so much an aid to litigation as a means of avoiding it altogether.47
A third finance agency reaction may be to increase the size
of the merchants' reserve fund.48  While this might limit the
44. Kripke, supra note 1, at 472.
45. Comment, supra note 33, at 437; Note, supra note 32, at 653-54.
46. Arguably, in order to go to court only once, the consumer
could interplead the merchant in the finance agency's suit, but in reality
his chances of doing so are slight. E.g., United States v. De Haven,
113 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
47. Utah and Oklahoma have statutes similar to the Minnesota
statute which have never had litigation under them. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 2.403, 2.404 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-2-403,
70B-2-404 (1971).
48. The finance agency subtracts a small percentage from each
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availability of credit to new merchants4 9 and force established
merchants to deal with one agency, it would give the agency
greater leverage over the merchant.
As long as recourse agreements and reserve funds exist, there
probably will be no impairment of negotiability or decrease in
available consumer credit. Fears that assignee vulnerability to
consumer defenses would impair transferability have generally
proved unfounded in other states.5" Fears that consumers might
wait until the last few payments and adopt a "sue me" attitude
have also proved unfounded. Most consumers do not complain
unless there is a serious defect,5 ' fearing non-payment will dam-
age their credit ratings.52 Also, where there is a lawsuit they
still bear the difficult burden of proving a defense (e.g., fraud)
and avoiding the hazards of estoppel.5 3 The statute may force
out of business small merchants unable to meet finance agency
demands for increased reserve accounts,5 4 but the predatory mer-
chants who have heretofore existed at the expense of the con-
sumer may experience the same effect.5 5
Finance agencies may even benefit from Section 325.941 by
an enhanced reputation since they no longer will be in the posi-
tion of holding bad bargains together through a preferred legal
position. Some may see this law as a first step towards allowing
all claims and defenses against an assignee or claims and defenses
up to the amount outstanding on the paper when it was trans-
fered. But under the Minnesota statute, the consumer is limited
sale of paper to fund a reserve account which the agency holds for the
merchant. It serves as a guarantee against the merchant not being
able to buy back bad consumer paper. When the fund reaches an
agreed amount the finance agency ceases levying on transfers of paper.
This device, combined with the recourse arrangement, makes it very
difficult for the finance agency to lose on any transaction.
49. H. KRIP , CONSUMER CREDr 260 (1971); Note, supra note
17, at 526; Note, supra note 32, at 655-56.
50. Note, supra note 17, at 524-25; Hogan, A Survey of State Retail
Installment Sales Legislation, 44 CoRNEL L.Q. 38, 73 (1958); Jordan
& Warren, supra note 17, at 436; Sutherland, Article 3, Logic, Experience
and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 230; Vernon, supra note 2, at
548. But see Note, supra note 32, at 630-56.
51. Littlefield, supra note 1, at 282.
52. H. KnIPKE, supra note 49, at 308.
53. Universal C.IT. Credit Corp. v. Cyr, 160 Me. 152, 200 A.2d 213
(1964); Universal Credit Co. v. Enyart, 231 Mo. App. 299, 98 S.W.2d 120
(1936); see Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 30 U. CHr. L. Rsv. 469, 482 (1963).
54. Note, supra note 32, at 642-50.
55. Note, supra note 43, at 418. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer
fDefenses: Plugging the Hole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 272,
281 & n.29 (1969).
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to the assertion of set-offs,56 and thus is provided with an incen-
tive to assert his defense as soon as a defect occurs." If claims
were not restricted this might not be the case. Perhaps the most
drastic step would be the first suggested alternative-to allow
all claims (e.g., down-payment) and defenses the consumer has
against the merchant to be asserted against the assignee.,'
However, this may well be a risk that finance agencies could not
accept without raising credit prices to a prohibitive level.,"
56. MINN. STAT. § 325.941 (3) (1971).
57. See text following note 17 supra.
58. H. KRipKE, supra note 49, at 261-62.
59. Littlefield, supra note 55, at 289; Malcom & Willier, A Uniform
Consumer Credit for Massachusetts?-A Dialogue, 54 MAss. L.Q. 35,
50 (1969).
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